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NOTE
EXCLUSIVE DEALING IMPLEMENTED THROUGH
REFUSALS TO DEAL: THE REFUSED PARTY
Exclusive dealing arrangements exist in a number of forms. They
may be created by requirements contracts or by contracts which pro-
vide for future purchases on a scale that is designed to meet all of the
buyer's needs. Exclusive dealing may also be achieved without the use
of a contract when the buyer is coerced on a continuing basis to pur-
chase from only one source in order to maintain the business contact.
These arrangements may be highly desirable to a seller for many rea-
sons, some of which are anticompetitive, such as foreclosure of com-
petitors' sales opportunities.' Exclusive dealing is thus a form of verti-
cal integration, 2 i.e., it is designed to secure a channel for sale of goods
or services which is not open to competitive alternatives.
Congress has provided statutory protection against anticompetitive
practices, including exclusive dealing arrangements, in section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act 3 (hereinafter referred
1. There is little work on the effects of exclusive dealing arrangements, but what
exists is best discussed under the more general problem of verticle integration in Kessler
& Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YA=E L.J. 1, 21 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as Kessler & Stern].
2. See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements under
the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 306-08.
S. There is a further proscription which arises under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1963). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor ...." The act of an individual dealer could comprise either monopolizing
or attempting to monopolize. Monopolizing is the unlawful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power. The process is unlawful when it contains the element of intentional
exclusion of competitors, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), "as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570-71 (1964). The consistent nemesis of the courts has been defining monopoly power.
Judge Learned Hand speculated that 90% of a market certainly meant monopoly power,
64% was doubtful, and 33% was dearly insufficient. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America supra at 464. The most recent and reasonable attempt at a comprehensive ratio-
nalization of the diverse definitions of monopoly power defines it as the power to control
prices and exclude competition. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari to the Supreme Court,
Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. The Kroger Co., No. 886 October Term, 1968. Proof of the other
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to as section 1 and section 3). Section 1 declares illegal "Every contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . ." Section 8
declares it unlawful to "make a sale or contract for sale conditioned on
the purchaser's not dealing in goods of a competitor of the seller if the
effect would be such as to substantially lessen competition."' It is
doubtful that the differences in the wording of the statutes will result
in differences in application, 6 and with respect to the specific area dis-
cussed herein there has been no judicial declaration of a basis for differ-
ing results under the two statutes. 7 The prohibitions of these provi-
sions are given force by private litigants under section 4 of the Clayton
Act with a private right of action for treble damages, costs, and attor-
ney's fees to "any person ... injured by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws .... ,,
Despite the prohibitions of sections 1 and 3 and the relief which is
provided for injured parties in section 4 of the Clayton Act, the major-
ity of lower courts facing the question have refused to recognize any
offense, attempt to monopolize, requires a showing both that the acts were such that they
"would be likely to accomplish such monopolization," Kansas City Star v. United States,
240 F.2d 643, 663 (8th Cir. 1957), and that there was an accompanying specific intent to
monopolize, as distinguished from an acceptance under monopolization, as sufficient proof
of intent in the recognized consequences of business practices. United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
In several exclusive dealing cases, the terminated dealers have attempted to bring an
action under section 2, but the theory has not proven successful. E.g., Amplex of Mary-
land, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1036 (1968). Should the approach to the offense of monopolization which has been raised
in Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. The Kroger Co. be successful, proving the offense of monopoliza-
tion should be much easier and should find a ready application in the area of exclusive
dealing, since exclusive dealing is directed toward the imposition of competitively irrele-
vant restraints upon competitors.
4. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1963).
5. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963).
6. It has been found "difficult to produce evidence of the view that any instance of
foreclosing competition bad enough to infringe the Clayton Act would escape condemna-
tion under the Sherman Act." A. NEALE, THE ANTrIRusT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 195 (1960). But cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953).
7. This may derive from a reluctance on the part of the courts to consider the section 1
issue in favor of simply deciding the issue under section 3. See, e.g., Standard Oil and
Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Alles Corporation v. Senco
Products Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964).
8. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963). "The Statute does not confine its protection to
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.... The Act is comprehensive
in its terms and coverage protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices
by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
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cause of action for a dealer whose business has been injured as a result
of his refusal to participate in an unlawful exclusive dealing arrange-
ment. Private suits have been further frustrated by frequent judicial
statements that one has the right unilaterally to refuse to deal for any
reason. 10 The refused buyer is faced with three basic problems in de-
termining whether he has recourse against the seller under antitrust
law: (1) Does an arrangement created by refusals to deal enjoy special
exemption from the antitrust laws, and does the situation in which he
is acting fall within any such exemption? (2) Does there exist, or, had
he complied, would there have existed, an arrangement in violation of
the antitrust laws? (3) If the acts of the refusing seller do result or
would have resulted in an antitrust violation, does the refused party
have a cause of action?
I RIGHT OF REFUSAL TO DEAL: THE COLGATE DOCTRINE
Though it is not without limits," the courts have recognized the gen-
eral right of an individual to refuse to deal. 12 This right has been main-
tained despite the fact that the refusal may be in furtherance of an
arrangement which is basically similar in purpose, effect and imple-
9. Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968); Associated Beverages Co. v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 287
F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1961) (dictum); McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1959); Allied Equipment Co. v. Weber Engineered Products, 237 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1956); Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956); Leo J.
Me)berg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875
(1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821
(1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); cf. Hunter Douglas Corp. v. Lando, 215 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.
1954). The Sixth Circuit has not taken the majority approach. Alles Corp. v. Senco
Products, Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964); cf. Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
10. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
11. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
12. The courts have consistently applied restraints when the action included group
boycotts or refusals to deal. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914), held that the Sherman Act was violated when the members of the
association agreed not to deal with wholesalers who also sold directly to the public.
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In order to destroy competition
from those not in the guild, the defendants had a policy of declining to sell to retailers
who sold the products of manufacturers who copied the products of the Guild members.
The plan of the Guild was found in violation of the Sherman Act because (I) it restricted
outlets for the sale of goods of manufacturers, (2) it imposed a boycott against all
purchasers who did not comply with the restrictions, and (3) it restricted the business
action of the members of the Guild.
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mentation to arrangements illegal under the antitrust laws, 8 such as
exclusive dealing arrangements. The protection for bare refusals to
deal by an individual is lost when such refusals are to further a monop-
olistic plan14 or are accompanied by unlawful acts. 1
The earliest statement of this position on one's right to refuse to deal
under the antitrust laws came in United States v. Colgate & Co."0 The
Court accepted the indictment as charging only simple refusal to deal
and stated:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, con-
tracts and combinations which probably would unduly interfere
with the free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish
to engage, in trade and commerce,r-in a word, to preserve the
right of freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long-recog-
nized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely pri-
vate business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
to parties with whom he will deal. And, or course, he may an-
nounce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell.17
Anticipating the policy adopted by the Supreme Court in Colgate, the
Second Circuit, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat
Co., found that qualifying the antitrust laws in this manner was justi-
fied to insure the continued protection of the right to refuse to deal
with anyone despite the fact that the refusal might rest on "prejudice
13. Compare Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963) with
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
14. Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (plan to force advertisers to
cease using the radio station by refusal to accept advertising in the newspaper from
anyone advertising on the radio declared to be unlawful as an attempt to monopolize);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (held that defendant Kodak had
attempted to monopolize film distribution through purchase of competitors of the plain-
tiff wholesaler and refusal to sell to the plaintiff except at retail prices after an unsuc-
cessful attempt to purchase plaintiff's business); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms,
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (held that there was an attempt to monopolize in a
refusal to deliver rugs to the plaintiff after plaintiff successfully underbid the defendant
on a government contract).
15. E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
16. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
17. Id. at 307. Automobile manufacturers no longer have this degree of discretion.
There is a special statutory provision for treble damages for an automobile dealer if his
franchise is cancelled or not renewed when the manufacturer has not acted in "good
faith." See Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act,
41 DEr. L.J. 245 (1964).
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or malice.""' Modern thinking would seem to have modified this ra-
tionale to allow regulation of business decisions when they would frus-
trate some governmental policy.19
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.20 is presently the controlling case
interpreting Colgate. Parke, Davis had an announced policy of refusing
to deal with retailers who failed to observe its suggested minimum
resale prices. It induced its wholesalers to stop selling to non-complying
retailers and then told several retailers that, if they would adhere to the
resale price, other retailers would also comply. Parke, Davis permitted
the discontinued retailers to be reinstated if they were willing to
maintain the suggested prices. The Supreme Court held that Parke,
Davis went beyond the allowances of Colgate in refusing to deal with
wholesalers in order to obtain their assistance to gain retailer com-
pliance. In obtaining the assistance of the wholesalers, Parke, Davis
created a conspiracy2' (with the Court terming the violation under the
now broader generic term, "combination") 22 in restraint of trade with
the retailers and wholesalers, thereby violating section l. 23 By this stan-
dard the manner in which the refusal to deal is used becomes determin-
ative of legality to a great extent. The proper emphasis should be on
the purpose with which the refusal to deal is made.
The essential similarity of economic effect from arrangements ac-
complished through prior warnings with subsequent refusal to deal
18. 227 F. 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1915). Fulda, Individual Refusal to Deal: When Does Single-
Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 590, 603 (1966), sug-
gests that a reason for distinguishing unilateral from collective conduct lies in the fact
that collective power is inherently dangerous because of the likelihood of its detrimental
use,
19. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
20. 362 U S. 29 (1960).
21. As Parke, Davis was interpreted in Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S 145, 149
(1968), the combination with the retailers arose because their acquiescence in the sug-
gested prices was secured by threats of termination; the combination with wholesalers
arose because they cooperated in terminating price-cutting retailers.
22, Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (discussed in note 100 infra).
23. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); see Osborn v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) (held that when one employs any other means to
obtain compliance with a policy which has been announced and then effectuated through
refusals to deal, there exists an arrangement which is subject to the antitrust laws).
Describing the permissible scope of the refusal to deal, the Second Circuit in George W.
Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960), stated that,
"The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass
even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare
in this day of complex business enterprise."
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and those arising from illegal combinations or contracts was recognized
in Parke, Davis. However, the Court felt that, so long as Colgate was
not overruled, the result would be tolerated to maintain the right of
discretion in dealing.24 It has been suggested that the Court ought to
overrule Colgate or at least allow it to die peacefully. 21 While the right
to refuse to deal is important, it may be more important to limit that
right when it is used in a manner offensive to public policy, namely
in unreasonable restraint of trade or in a manner such as to substan-
tially lessen competition.
The Court has maintained a limitation on refusals to deal when they
were being used to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.26 If the right to refuse to deal is limited by section 2, then it should
just as clearly be limited by section 1 and section 3. There is no clear
logical difference between dealing on a condition by express agreement
and dealing on that same condition obtained through prior announce-
ment and threats of refusal to deal.27 Indeed, the use of threats of refus-
als to deal may be limited to the economically more powerful and thus
truly the anthithesis of modern antitrust policy. Preventing the manu-
facturer from refusing to deal for anticompetitive reasons would not
compel him to deal with anyone. We simply could not make an ob-
jectionable intent a decisive factor in choosing his customers.21 Such an
approach would help to alleviate a present weakness in the antitrust
laws.29
The Supreme Court, while continuing to assert Colgate's vitality, has
24. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-46 (1960).
25. Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1951)
(dissenting opinion).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 689 (1962).
28. Id. at 689. It has been suggested that the present decisions should lead to this re-
sult to be consistent. "After all, why is it any more an 'implied agreement' or a 'com-
bination' for a manufacturr to reinstate a repentant, discontinued dealer who had been
deviating from suggested resale prices after assurance of reform, than for a manufacturer
to commence relations with a new dealer who is told that deviation from stipulated
prices will result in termination of his dealership?" Weisbard, Resale Price Maintenance,
Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements, 10 ANTrmuST BuIL. 341, 351 (1965).
29. In prohibiting contracts, combinations, and conspiracies by which unreasonable
effects arise rather than prohibiting the effects themselves, the laws have a limited
capacity to deal with unilateral actions. Note, An Interstate Circuit Approach to The
Refusal to Deal Dilemma Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 64 YALE L.J. 581, 584.85
(1955); Brief for Justice Department as Amicus Curiae at 5-8, 12, Amplex of Maryland,
Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 389 U.S. 1036 (1968) (denying cert.).
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not yet applied the Colgate rule to protect an arrangement.30 Lower
courts have, however, found occasion to apply it. For example, Tobman
v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop3' held that the seller came within the pro-
tection of Colgate when employees of the defendant-seller sought the
names of price cutters and acted on the basis of that information to
eliminate the offending parties from further dealing. Such an approach
would not seem to be consistent with the spirit of the antitrust laws,
and a clear departure from the dogma of Colgate may be necessary to
prevent the recurrence of such holdings by the lower courts. Of course,
an insistence by the courts on the permissiveness of Colgate will not
necessarily be detrimental to a litigant seeking to prevent exclusive
dealing. Nevertheless, so long as the Colgate doctrine is not overruled,
a potential course of conduct is perpetuated under cover of legality
which has no economic justification and which effectively achieves the
identical result as conduct which is illegal.
II. CRTRIA FOR ILLEGALITY OF EXCLUSIVE
DEALING ARRANGEMENTS
3 2
All dealing arrangements impose some restraint upon trade3 3 and
would be unlawful under a literal reading of the statutes. But since the
antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, the basic test of
illegality turns on defining the conditions surrounding the dealing or
elements of dealing which are inimical to it.34 With respect to exclu-
sive dealing, there is disagreement as to the proper interpretation of
the cases, and formulating readily applicable tests which would prove
anticompetitive effects remains "a cloudy, much disputed, and difficult
question."' 35
30. Weisbard, Resale Price Maintenance. Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements,
10 ANTITRUST BULL. 341, 347 (1965).
31. 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961); see Graham v. Triangle Publications. Inc., 233
F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
32. The analysis in this section of the tying and exclusive dealing cases was suggested
by Gray L. Dorsey, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
33. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. Wilson, Some Problems Relative to Franchise Agreements, 11 ANurrausr BULL. 473,
479 (1966).
35. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 693 (1962); see Bok, The Tampa Elec-
tric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup.
CT. REV. 267; Smith, Vertical Arrangements in Antitrust Law: Exclusive Dealing Ar-
rangements, 22 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 18 (1963).
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The criteria for illegality of imposed exclusive dealing arrangements
appear to be derived from the cases dealing with "tying" arrangements.
"Tying" refers to situations in which the sale of one line of articles is
conditioned on the purchase of a second line or at least on the prom-
ise that, if products within the second line are purchased, they will be
purchased from the other party to the agreement. The demand for the
tying product is used to create a demand for the tied product not on
a basis of the tied product's desirability or any independent business
judgment on the part of the purchaser in a competitive offering but,
rather, on terms which foreclose independent business judgment and
competitive sales to the extent that the purchaser would not have
purchased the same products absent the agreement.
Present decisions on tying follow from the opinion of the Supreme
Court in International Salt Co. v. United States.30 International Salt
had patents on two machines which it leased to manufacturers across
the country upon the condition that the salt for use in the machines
had to be purchased from the lessor unless the lessee could purchase
the salt at a lower price after giving International Salt a chance of
meeting any offer. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the sim-
ple proof of the sale of $500,000 worth of salt in 1944 under the condi-
tion of the lease, holding that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market."87 As a result of this decision,
tying joined price fixing, division of markets, and group boycotts as per
se offenses.38 Proof of the arrangement under the other per se offenses
is sufficient proof of a violation. The reason the Court requires proof
of foreclosure from some substantial market in tying cases probably lies
in the difference between the nature of the practices. Among the per se
offenses, only tying arrangements and combinations for resale price
maintenance are achieved through coercing the buyer into agreeing to
the restrictive terms. Resale price maintenance may result either by
agreement or from the use of coercion. Proof of a combination to main-
tain resale prices requires a showing that there was effective coercion.39
Otherwise, price setting along with market-division and group boycotts
is an offense in which the parties may join in anticipation of eventual
36. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
37. Id. at 396.
38. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boy-
cotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. Ml1 (1899)
(division of markets).
39. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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profit. In tying, however, there is no anticipated benefit which may
accrue to the purchaser; otherwise, he would be a willing participant
and there would be no reason for the inclusion of such purchase re-
quirements in the contract. Tying is wrongful when coercion results in
the overcoming of an independent business choice.40 The importance
of this foreclosure being attached to a substantial market is that the
imposition of such conditions on a number of purchase situations
raises the inference that some purchases of the tied product were made
under the influence of the tying condition so that probably the requi-
site element of overcoming independent business judgment exists.
This reasoning is apparent in the case of Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States.41 Northern Pacific had conditioned a large number of
leases of various property holdings on the use of its railway system. The
Supreme Court restated the test for illegality as requiring that "a 'not
insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected."42 Under this
requirement, proof of any effect would seem adequate. Sufficient proof
would then lie in simply establishing that the independent business
judgment of any purchaser was actually overcome. In the tying cases,
there arises the further problem as to the requisite power for an un-
lawful foreclosure simply because there can be no real foreclosure if
the dealing is not under compulsion. At one time, it appeared that the
power to foreclose might have to be proved to be on the scale of classic
monopoly concepts.4 3 Northern Pacific foreclosed this line of argument
in holding that the power to be feared existed at any time there was
"sufficient" power actually to tie and by stating the prohibition with
this term. 4" There is no real concern here with proving that there has
been an effect on competition, for the pernicious anticompetitive chai-
acter of the per se offenses obviates any need for discussing that prob-
lem.415 Proof of foreclosure of a market accrues by proving the actuality
or by proving the probability that business judgment has been over-
come.
40. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
41. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
42. ld. at 6.
43. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606-08 (1953).
44. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958) (though this ap-
pears to be a far more practical approach, its ready acceptance was by no means certain
as witnessed in the courts' handling of monopoly problems under classical concepts when
there is a readily available practical alternative also defining the elements of the offense
in terms of the policy behind the statute. See note 3 supra.
45. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265 (1963).
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The basic approach to the tying situation developed in International
Salt was found applicable to test the legality of imposed exclusive deal-
ing arrangements in Standard Oil & Standard Stations, Inc. v. United
States (Standard Stations).46 Prior to this decision, exclusive dealing
cases required an analysis of comprehensive market details to determine
whether the probable effect of the arrangement would be to substan-
tially lessen competition.4 7 In Standard Stations, the company had sales
which in one year comprised about 23%0 of the gasoline sold in the
area. In this period, 6.7%0 of total sales were made under exclusive
dealing contracts with independent service stations. The lower court,
seemingly, adopted a test near that of International Salt,48 such that the
issue presented to the Supreme Court was:
w .. hether the requirement of showing that the effect of the
agreements "may be to substantially lessen competition" may be
met simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is
affected or whether it must also be demonstrated that competitive
activity has actually diminished, or probably will diminish.49
Section 3 forbids tying and exclusive dealing in the same terms, 0
which meant that the Court was faced with a comparison of the two in
order to determine if a different test would be more effective in imple-
menting the purpose of the act. In the comparison, tying arrangements
were found to be justifiably restricted as serving "hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition."5' 1 On the other hand, require-
ments contracts were said to have some purpose in promoting compe-
tition by assuring supply and price, thus allowing long-term planning.
Such contracts might also reduce selling expenses, protect against price
fluctuations, and offer a predictable market.62 Because of possible legit-
imate economic objectives in exclusive dealing, the inference of com-
petitive injury solely from evidence of substantial sales under restric-
tion was felt to be weakened.5 3 That is, to the Court it seemed less
likely that the independent business judgment of a purchaser under an
46. 337 US. 293 (1949).
47. Weisbard, Resale Price Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements,
10 ANTnTRuSr BuLL. 341, 366 (1965).
48. See text accompanying notes 36-37 infra.
49. Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299
(1949).
50. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
51. Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
(1949).
52. Id. at 306-07.
53. Id. at 307.
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exclusive dealing contract had been overcome simply by proving sub-
stantial sales under such, as it seemed more likely that such agreements
would be undertaken willingly because of the legitimate economic ad-
vantages. The Court did not consider possible differences between im-
posed and negotiated exclusive dealing arrangements.
A number of tests were suggested that could be used in determining
the legality of an exclusive arrangement if the courts were to attempt
to define an effect upon competition, but it was recognized that "seri-
ous difficulties would attend the attempt to apply these tests."'5 4 The
Court concluded "that the qualifying clause of section 3 is satisfied by
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of
the line of commerce affected."5 5 One would have to anticipate the
same interpretation of this as may be derived from the tying cases in
light of the fact that where the exclusive dealing is the result of coer-
cion and a substantial amount of dealing has been done on the basis of
the exclusive agreement the same inference as to the overcoming of
independent business judgment arises as was found applicable in the
tying cases.56 As a result, either proof of any actually effective coercion
or proof of substantial sales under coercion would be sufficient to prove
the illegality of an exclusive dealing arrangement.
The purpose of imposed exclusive dealing arrangements is the re-
striction of competition, and one would assume that they would not
be used but for the belief that they would have such an effect. If those
54. Id. at 308.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Robinson, Providing for Orderly Marketing of Goods, 15 ABA ANTITRUST SEcrION
282, 306 (1959). On the other hand, if the dealing were the result of negotiation the
same inference could not arise at all. The justifications suggested by the Supreme Court
in Standard Stations for the application of a different rule to exclusive dealing would
have substantial validity. The elements for providing illegality of exclusive dealing con-
tracts where there is no seller's coercion but where the contract is the result of negotia-
tion are the subject of Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
Just as tying uses economic power in one market to restrict competition on its merits in
another market, coerced exclusive dealing uses economic power in one market to restrict
competition on its merits in the same market. Negotiated exclusive dealing is competi-
tion on its merits which may or may not be carried so far as to become destructive.
Yet, most writers, e.g., Timberg, Some Working Antitrust Rules in Distributing Through
Franchised and Non-Franchised Outlets, 11 AN'rrrRusT BULL. 447, 448-50 (1966), feel that
the application of the title "exclusive dealing arrangement" in both Tampa Electric
and Standard Stations requires that the test of Tampa Electric be basic and that it
establish the necessary elements of proof in all "exclusive dealing" cases.
Similar coercion has also been handled under section 5 of the Clayton Act which pro-
hibits unfair methods of competition. E.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357
(1965).
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who create such arrangements are correct about the anticompetitive
effects, prevention of them will be beneficial to competition. Thus, the
justification for forbidding such arrangements is based on the view that
they constitute unnecessary market restrictions, the removal of which
can do little harm, while freeing markets for trading on competitive
bases.57
Discussion of the criteria of illegality in litigation by a discontinued
party is relevant only if the court requires proof of a prior illegal ar-
rangement with the discontinued dealer or an existing illegal arrange-
ment with other dealers. As will become apparent in subsequent dis-
cussion, one possible approach to cases of the type discussed herein
would not require proof concerning the illegality of an existing ar-
rangement; other approaches would require such proof. If the courts
would define illegality in terms of attempt, 8 there would seem to be no
need to prove any illegal exclusive dealing arrangement. In the event
the courts define illegality from past dealing between the parties,"D it
would seem sufficient for the dealer simply to show that he was coerced
into. the relationship. If the courts would approach illegality on the
basis of being in implementation of some existing arrangement,60 proof
of the illegality of that relationship under the terms of Standard Sta-
tions would be required.
III. UNLAWFUL ExcLusIvE DEALING: PRESENT APPROACH TO A
TERMINATED DEALER'S CAUSE OF ACTION
When faced with an apparently unlawful exclusive dealing arrange-
ment in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,61 the Fifth Cir-
cuit dismissed an action brought by a dealer who was cancelled for
failure to comply. After distributing Motorola's products for several
years, the plaintiff was informed by Motorola that it would be cancelled
as a distributor of Motorola products unless it discontinued the sale of
products of Motorola's competitors. The plaintiff refused these condi-
tions and, after its cancellation, brought a treble damage action. The
court seemingly presumed that the dealings of the defendant with
others in the scheme which it was implementing came within the ban
of section 3 and were subject to any action brought against those actual
57. A. NEALE, THE ANTmusr LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEICA, 196 (1960).
58. See section IV(B) infra.
59. See section IV(A) infra.
60. See section IV(C) infra.
61. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 845 U.S. 925 (1953).
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dealings, but the court affirmed a dismissal on the basis of a failure to
state a cause of action. It reasoned that section 3 covered only contracts
or actual dealings and not refusals to deal. As a further basis for the
dismissal, the court relied on what in its view was the unquestioned
right under Colgate unilaterally to refuse dealings with any person for
any reason.6 - This holding was coupled with a refusal to recognize an
actionable causal connection between the arrangements entered into
with other dealers and the injury to the plaintiff on the basis that it was
not those contracts but the absence of a contract with Motorola which
led to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. By implication, the court
held that the same causal problems would prevent the application of
section 1.
The court rejected the claim by the plaintiff that the acts of the
defendant's agents were illegal as resulting in an intra-corporate con-
spiracy.63 Since the complaint was dismissed on the pleadings, the court
never considered the possible illegality of the arrangement with other
dealers as anticompetitive by the requirements of Standard Stations;
nor was consideration given to the possible illegality of the arrange-
ment which would have existed between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant if the plaintiff had acceded to the defendant's demands.
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar situation in Leo J. Mey-
berg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp.64 The alleged violation of section 3
was based on the defendant's termination because of the plaintiff's
refusal to deal exclusively in the defendant's products. There was no
indication in the case as to whether the defendant had exclusive ar-
rangements with others or even that the arrangement would have been
unlawful if entered into. The evidence merely showed an attempt to
create an exclusive dealing arrangement. Perhaps a further look at the
facts would have clarified these points; but the court affirmed the dis-
missal, without citing authority, on the same reasoning that prevailed
in Nelson v. Motorola, viz. that, absent a contract as required by the
wording of section 3, the plaintiff had no grounds on which to base a
cause of action.
More recently, in Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine
62. See section I supra. The Colgate doctrine, however, is not concerned with denying
a cause of action to a party because he has been discontinued as happened in Neson v.
Motorola. It is concerned with protecting the overall legality of arrangements which are
created through bare refusals to deal. Thus, it is difficult to determine specifically what
support the court was asserting for its decision by reference to Colgate.
63. See note 88 infra.
64. 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
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Corp.,65 the Fourth Circuit implied a limited departure from the ap-
proach adopted by the earlier exclusive dealing cases. The court found
no violation of section 1, under which the plaintiff presented his claim.
The court accepted as findings of fact that the termination of the plain-
tiff was not held out threateningly to the other dealers, that there was
no evidence of any combination or conspiracy linking Outboard to its
other dealers, and that the contracts with them were not on a basis of
exclusive dealing.66 Though section 3 was not pleaded by the plaintiff,
the court then considered that provision. The court quoted an earlier
analysis67 of the same problem which relied on Nelson v. Motorola,08
and Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp.60 The Amplex
decision is notable for the implication that in future decisions the
Court will take a different approach when there is a connection be-
tween the use of cancellation as a threat to other dealers or when there
is a combination between the manufacturer and other dealers regard-
ing exclusive dealing which is in violation of section 3 and in which the
dealer is cancelled as a result of implementing that combination. Yet
the court is still holding that a cancellation of a dealer for refusal to
enter into what would be an unlawful exclusive dealing arrangement
is not actionable under the antitrust laws. Moreover, the court appeared
to accept the earlier view that there is no relationship between an
existing arrangement and a cancellation or refusal of another so long
as the refusal is not used threateningly in the arrangement.
The Justice Department supported the plaintiff, Amplex, in its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.70 It took the position, on
the basis of its reading of the facts, that a refusal to deal is actionable
by a private litigant when it is used to gain or in an attempt to gain
agreement to an arrangement which, if agreed to, would be one of a
number of contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade or on condition
or understanding of unlawful exclusive dealing, i.e., in violation of
section 1 or section 3. This proposal is broader than would at first
65. 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
66. Id. at 114.
67. Id. at 115, citing McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th
Cir. 1959).
68. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 #.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
69. 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
70. Brief for Justice Department as Amicus Curiae, Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Out.
board Marine Corp., 389 US. 1036 (1968) (denying cert.).
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appear as it is in conjunction with a proposal within the same brief for
a strong limitation on the meaning of Colgate.7 1
Apparently only the Sixth Circuit, in Alles Corporation v. Senco
Products, Inc.,72 has gone against the majority view and held actionable
the cancellation of a dealer in a manufacturer's implementation of an
illegal exclusive dealing arrangement. Yet, even this approach may
not be as complete as the Supreme Court may be willing to accept,
since the Court may not require that the attempted violation be one
of a number of contracts or have been actually in effect but may find
a violation in the attempted creation of a single illegal arrangement.73
If the system seems to deny the right of a private action, the question
arises as to whether there is need to encourage such suits. The purpose
of section 4 of the Clayton Act is to "supplement Government enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, ' 74 through multiplying the numbers who
are actively enforcing them.75
In support of the need for private actions as a supplement to poten-
tial governmental litigation, it has been suggested that private actions
are more effective in implementing the antitrust laws for several rea-
sons. First, it would take a vast bureaucratic army to equal quantita-
tively the effectiveness of interested private parties. Second, the private
action gives enforcement over to persons more familiar with the situ-
ation and likely to be in possession of the evidence upon which to
found a suit with the financial incentive to bring the evidence forward.
Third, there is much to be said for repairing injury which has arisen
either as a result of an attempted antitrust violation or as the result
of maintaining a successful one.76 Yet the majority of decisions in the
area of exclusive dealing have held that a dealer cancelled or refused
dealing for his refusal to enter into or abide by an illegal exclusive
dealing arrangement has no cause of action against the seller.
71. Id. at 12.
72. 329 F.2d 567 (1964).
75. Injury to a single party was found sufficient as the basis for an antitrust suit in
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp.
884 (D.R.I. 1968).
74. United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
FEERAL ANrriTRusT LAWS 873-75 (1968).
75. Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir.
1954). cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
76. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTrraur BULL.
167, 168-69 (1958).
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IV. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES
As an example of possible litigation from the same factual setting,
the government was successful in United States v. Sun Oil Co.77 in
obtaining a judgment against the defendant for violation of section 3.
The dealers were given franchises on the condition that if one failed
to operate his business according to the terms of Sun, he would be
terminated and replaced by another dealer. One such term was Sun's
policy of requiring its dealers to handle its gasoline exclusively, and
pursuant to that end, Sun coerced its dealers to enter various contracts
by which they pledged to buy exclusively from Sun.78 This was en-
forced by investigations of dealers and reminders to the dealers of
Sun's right to terminate the agreements on thirty days' notice if they
failed to comply.79 On these facts, the court, relying on Standard Sta-
tions,0 found that competition had been foreclosed in a substantial
share of the market. The court enjoined the defendant from coercing
retailers under written contracts and tacit agreements to purchase de-
fendant's products exclusively.
Presumably, a competitor of the manufacturer would be able to
bring an action at any time that the government could act if he could
prove injury. If we assume a situation in which either the government
or a competitor could bring an action against an arrangement, do the
antitrust laws provide a basis for relief in a suit brought by a dealer
injured by the manufacturer in the implementation of the plan? The
majority position creates a weakness in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws in effectively denying the most powerful tool of enforcement,
private litigation. Several reasonable and simple means of reaching the
opposite result may be suggested: (1) a cause of action for one who
complies but subsequently refuses to continue in the illegal arrange-
ment, (2) a cause of action for refusal to deal because of a refusal to
enter into an unlawful agreement, or (3) a cause of action based on
the causal connection between the arrangement (between the seller
and the other dealers) and the injury to the cancelled dealer.8 '
77. 176 F. Supp. 715 (ED. Pa. 1959).
78. Id. at 727.
79. Id. at 723, 725.
80. See section II supra.
81. Intra-corporate conspiracy is an additional approach which has enjoyed some pop-
ularity. The proponents of this theory, e.g., Kessler 8: Stem at 88-91, suggest that the
agents of a corporation conspire in deciding to refuse to deal and that a sufficient con-
spiracy arises within the corporation to bring the corporation within the ambit of sec-
tion 1 on the basis of respondeat superior. The first judicial test of this theory occurred
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A. Suit for Termination after Compliance then Refusal to Continue
The discontinued dealer may have an action if he is refused dealing
for a failure to abide by an unlawful agreement with the seller. The
Fourth Circuit held in Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.82 that the ter-
mination of the plaintiff for refusal to abide by an unlawful agreement
between Sinclair and its dealers was actionable. Osborn's failure to
purchase sufficient quantities of tires, batteries, and accessories con-
tributed to the cancellation of his lease and the sales of gasoline from
the defendant. There was a recognition that a seller has a limited right
not to deal and that, if the seller uses any one of the various proscribed
arrangements to suppress competition which is created by something
beyond a simple announcement of policy and declination to sell
(Parke, Davis), his conduct falls under the proscription of the anti-
trust laws. The holding of the court is, in summary, that "Where the
customer is cut off in a coercive attempt to further a forbidden ar-
rangement... he is entitled to recover all damages issuing from that
in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 925 (1953), in which the court refused it. If one does accept the argument that
the corporation can be guilty under respondeat superior for the acts of its agents in
conspiring to restrain trade, the fact that the conspiracy was unsuccessful does not destroy
its actionability. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n. 59 (1940),
held section 1 applicable whether the concerted activity were abortive or successful.
Kessler & Stern, at 89.
The intra-corporate conspiracy argument derives its primary value from elimination
of the problems of causation with respect to the dealings with others on the plaintiff's
level such as were important in Nelson v. Motorola. Since the conspiracy is directed
against the plaintiff, it is readily actionable through the use of the contracts with others
to show the general illegality of the arrangement as being in restraint of trade. The
problem in this analysis is that it is dearly intended as no more than a device to avoid
what the courts have held to be a limitation in the law. It admits of no general ap-
plication; for example, "it should not be applied to per se situations; otherwise, to give
one illustration, every corporate refusal to deal would constitute a boycott, illegal per
se." Kessler & Stern at 90. If such an approach were taken by the courts, it would not
only create a dangerous precedent for expansion into other areas but would create a
need to maintain an unusual inconsistency of interpretation of the same statutory lan-
guage. Preferably, if the courts see a need for dosing this loophole in antitrust enforce-
ment, they will do so by maintaining a consistent interpretation of conspiracy under
section I while acting on the basis of the real policy arguments for seeking a change,
i.e., either the real causal connection between the refusal to deal and the implementa-
tion of an illegal arrangement, or, more broadly, on the basis of the possible need for
making section I applicable against attempted violations.
A presentation of various cases and reference to a number of artides dealing with
intra-corporate conspiracy appear in S. Op'rN.cHF & G. WESTON, FEVmuL ANTrrmusr
LAws 202-09 (1968).
82. 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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punitive action. To deny him this would eviscerate section 4."88 The
court, to its satisfaction, concluded that the cases, "show without ex-
ception that damages may be recovered for a refusal to deal in further-
ance of an arrangement condemned by the antitrust laws, whatever
form of trade restraint the arrangement takes."8 4 Does this logic go
beyond the facts of the case? What if there have been no prior deal-
ings?85 This case was claimed to be consistent with the cases following
Nelson v. Motorola on the basis that they all involved "either the ques-
tion whether there existed an unlawful arrangement or the question
whether the particular refusal to deal was to further such an arrange-
ment."8 6 At least some of those cases, in the reasoning of the printed
opinions, do not appear to be consistent with this assertion by the
court.
87
Reversing a summary judgment for the defendant, the Fifth Circuit
held in a similar case that the plaintiff had stated an actionable claim
under both section 1 regarding resale price maintenance and section 3
regarding a tying arrangement.88 The defendant leased a service sta-
tion to the plaintiff on a yearly basis. At the same time, the plaintiff
and the defendant entered into a sales arrangement for certain quan-
tities of the defendant's gasoline and motor fuels. There was a conflict
in the evidence as to whether the defendant refused to renew the lease
as a result of plaintiff's failure to follow a pricing policy of the defen-
dant. The court held that there was a triable issue as to whether the
failure to renew the plaintiff's lease and sales agreement were occa-
sioned by the plaintiff's refusal to comply with an agreement, com-
bination, or conspiracy organized by the defendant to secure adherence
to its prices in violation of section 1.
The court also found that there was evidence of a tying arrangement
in linking the sale of gasoline to the sale of tires, batteries and acces-
sories, and that there was a triable issue as to the unlawfulness of that
tying arrangement. The defendant was held not to be entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claim of a tying arrangement
83. Id. at 573.
84. Id. at 574-75.
85. Compare Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 875 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967) with Broussard v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 850 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
86. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 824 F.2d 566, 574 (4th Cir. 1963).
87. E.g., Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
821 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
88. Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 850 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1965).
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which would be in violation of section 3. There appears to be little
reason to attach significance to the fact that price fixing or tying ar-
rangements were involved here rather than coerced exclusive dealing
arrangements. The principle that termination of dealing for failure to
comply with an unlawful arrangement is actionable would seem to be
consistently applicable. The Sixth Circuit applied such an approach
to exclusive dealing arrangement in Alles Corporation v. Senco Pod-
ucts, Inc.89 by finding that an actionable claim under section 3 was
presented by plaintiff's assertion that an implied term of a contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant had been that the plaintiff
would not deal in the goods of others and that the plaintiff had been
terminated because of his sale of competitive goods.
B. Suit for Refusal to Enter into an Unlawful Arrangement
A suit for refusal to deal because of the dealer's refusal to enter into
an unlawful agreement was brought in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 0
The plaintiff alleged that he was damaged as a result of his refusal to
become a party to an illegal system of exclusive dealing and tying ar-
rangements. The court held that the plaintiff could recover on this
theory if he could prove the illegality of the arrangement. The court
indicated further that it could see no problems in proof of proximate
cause under either section 1 or section 3, because the injury to the
plaintiff which occurs from the defendant's efforts to create such an
illegal arrangement is injury "by reason of" conduct forbidden by the
law and therefore is sufficient for a private action under section 4 of
the Clayton Act."'
Support for this approach appears in Osborn v. Sinclair Refining
Co. decided by the Fourth Circuit, in which the court stated:
In many, if not most, private antitrust actions, the principal
element of damage is precisely what we are now considering-the
loss of profits caused by a refusal to deal. If a seller, who is not a
monopolist and who does not act in concert with co-conspirators,
nevertheless is able to coerce buyers into a combination or ar-
rangement whereby prices are fixed, or the sale of the one product
is tied to the sale of another, or dealing is required to be exclu-
sive, and if that seller could refuse to deal with buyers unwilling
to adhere to the unlawful arrangement without answering for the
resulting losses, the effectiveness of the section 4 treble-damage suit
as an enforcement measure would be to a great extent nullified.
89. 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964).
90. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
91. See note 8 supra.
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9.... Indeed, in many cases the only possible injury stems from
an unlawful refusal to deal, where there has been no prior experi-
ence whatever of business transactions between the parties.92
The Supreme Court appears to have taken the same position in Simp-
son v. Union Oil Co. 93 The defendant had entered into a price fixing
arrangement through a consignment and leasing system to its dealers
but it was claimed that Simpson was refused renewal of his lease be-
cause he sold below the fixed price. The Court held that the consign-
ment agreement was illegal.94 It held that, though a supplier can refuse
to deal, he does not get "immunity" if the arrangement is one of those
schemes condemned by the antitrust laws.95
One clear difficulty with these holdings, which rely on a refusal and
do not connect the refusal with some other arrangement, is that, by
itself, a refusal is not a vertical arrangement, but is merely a unilateral
attempt. Attempts are specifically prohibited by section 2 of the Sher-
man Act but are not prohibited by section 1 or section 3. To read at-
tempt into section 1 and section 3 is an impressive bit of "interstitial
legislation," 96 but the wording of Simpson indicates that this is a step
which the Court is willing to make.
C. Causation From Contract or Combination with Other Dealers
Though a causal relationship from contracts or combinations with
other dealers has appeared somewhat in the prior approaches, it de-
serves independent attention as a basis of an action because of differ-
ences in emphasis and occasional differences in application. The
essential argument is that, when a dealer is terminated for dealing in
the goods of a competitor so that the seller can maintain his entire
arrangement for exclusive dealings in violation of section 3, the con-
nection between the termination and the violation is clear. This final
approach is less complete than the prior one in that it would require
proof both that there was an existing arrangement and that the action-
able wrong was in implementation of that arrangement; however, it
has the advantage that the precedent for such a holding appears to be
more clearly established.
92. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
93. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
94. It is unclear why the agreement in Simpson v. Union Oil was unlawful. Because
of the ambiguity in the opinion it may later be interpreted as resting on any of a
number of possible grounds. Some of the problems which are thus raised appear for
consideration in Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I. 1968).
95. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).




This approach was suggested in the government's amicus brief in
Amplex. 97 The Fourth Circuit was nearing the same position, by im-
plication, in its Amplex decision; however, it added the requirement
that the implementation of the arrangements with other dealers con-
sist not merely of a termination but that termination must have been
used as a threat or means of coercion of other dealers.98 The lack of
any need to prove any of these points, even as suggested by the govern-
ment's brief, defines the precise difference between this and the prior
approach.
The Supreme Court appeared to affirm this position in Albrecht v.
The Herald Co." There, Albrecht ran a newspaper delivery business
in which he operated as an independent merchant. The Herald used
various means of coercion, at least in dealings with the defendant, to
induce a compliance with maximum resale prices. Albrecht sued for
the damages which arose as a result of the defendant's harassment. The
Court indicated that, although it was not pleaded, the plaintiff could
successfully have asserted "that respondent had combined with other
carriers because the firmly enforced price policy applied to all carriers,
most of whom acquiesced in it."100 This approach for the application
of the rule against combinations is antithetical to the holding of Nel-
son v. Motorola, for there is no requirement that there be a contract
or combination between The Herald and Albrecht.
CONCLUSIONS
If private action is to supplement governmental action, the courts
must provide a viable sanction for private enforcement against a dealer
who is creating or attempting to create an unlawful exclusive dealing
arrangement through termination of an unwilling dealer. A competi-
97. Brief for Justice Department as Amicus Curiae at 12, Amplex of Maryland, Inc.
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 389 U.S. 1036 (1968) (denying cert.).
98. Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
99. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
100. Id. at 150 n.6. Albrecht v. The Herald Co. gives new definition to the term "com-
bination" which had until that time been interpreted as falling within the term "con-
spiracy." Arrangements which fall under either of these terms and are in restraint of
trade are, of course, prohibited by section 1. Conspiracy and combination had, until
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., been based on willing and self-beneficial assent to the
scheme. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). Combination was
expanded in Albrecht to encompass antagonistic-coercive agreements. Some earlier writers,
e.g., Kessler & Stem at 86-88, came quite close to suggesting the same approach as the
text here presents but they found it necessary to rely on an interpretation of "conspiracy"
in terms which are covered by the present definition of "combination."
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tor of the restrictive seller -will find evidentiary problems in proof of
damages and quite likely will find difficulty in bringing forth evidence
of the arrangement. Of course, the firm which remains subject to the
arrangement is going to be reluctant to endanger its dealings in order
to sue for damages from being forced to deal with no one but the de-
fendant. On the other hand, the terminated dealer will quite likely
have collected evidence of the arrangement during negotiations prior
to the termination or refusal to deal.1 1 He will also have clearly mea-
surable damages flowing from the acts of the defendant.
A cause of action should be recognized for the terminated dealer.
There is ample precedent for such a holding and a practical need for
it as the only likely means of private enforcement. With such a change
incorporated into a pattern including the rule of Standard Stations
and abolition of the Colgate doctrine, small dealers could find a new
freedom from the possible pressures of powerful sellers that may com-
pel them to competitively unsound decisions which result in ultimate
detriment to the public.
101. Kessler S. Stem at 82.
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